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1. INTRODUCTION
I
T has become increasingly common to recognise that the strategic nature of
many topics of interest to students of international relations poses problems
for valid inference from observable data. A strategic decision is one in which
actors anticipate the likely responses of others, before deciding which course of
actions to take over a typically discrete number of possible actions. As such, they
attempt to avoid undesirable responses by other actors. Whenever an actor de-
cides on a course of action rather than another, ‘she prevents us from observing
what would have happened had she chosen the unrealized alternative’ (Smith,
1999, pp. 1255–56). Consequently, observed reality is a non-random sample of
the possibilities considered by the decision-maker. Smith (1999) and Signorino
(1999) use a Monte Carlo quasi-experimental design to clearly demonstrate the
inferential errors that are likely to occur when analysts do not handle the strategic
process that generated their data carefully. Reed (2000) extends this work with an
emphasis on the non-monotonicity of strategic processes. In this study, we follow
along the same path by introducing a simple formal model and a short simulation
to demonstrate that selection biases may have an impact on potential analyses of
trade policy decisions.
States use a variety of trade instruments in an attempt to change the behaviour
of the target state. Accordingly, decision-makers set off a course of action with
an eye toward how the targeted state will respond. Consequently, trade policy-
making is an intrinsically strategic decision. Nevertheless, most of what we know
about the use and effectiveness of trade policies comes from studies that pay little
attention to the selection effects imposed by strategic choice. Empirical studies
that evaluate the initiation and outcome of Section (Super) 301 (McMillan, 1990;
Bayard and Elliott, 1994; and Duchesne, 1997) or GATT/WTO disputes (Busch
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and Reinhardt, 2001 and 2002) provide us with a better understanding of the
factors that lead to a successful resolution of trade conflicts, but they also fail to
account for selection effects.1
It is only recently that the impact of selection effects has been identified and
studied in the subfield of international political economy (Noland, 1997; Busch,
2000; Przeworski and Vreeland, 2000; Reinhardt, 2001; and Nooruddin, 2002).
Noland (1997) and Busch (2000) correctly assert that there are several steps
preceding an American decision to target a foreign entity for trade retaliation.
Noland (1997) studies the United States unilateral imposition of trade retaliation
via Section 301 of the 1974 Trade Act, while Busch (2000) focuses on the
multilateral dispute settlement settings of the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade (GATT). They both delve into the machinery of American trade policy and
make an important distinction between the ‘opening’ of a case and its ‘outcome’.
However elegant their statistical analyses, they come short of accounting for-
mally or empirically for selections biases. In contrast, Przeworski and Vreeland
(2000) and Nooruddin (2002) are representative of few statistical studies that
account directly for selections biases in the subfield of international political
economy. The former cast their lot in the study of the International Monetary
Fund’s (IMF) loan-granting process, while the latter explores the United States’
decision to impose sanctions on foreign targets. This limited number of studies
taking seriously the potential impact of non-random selections biases provides us
with the motivation to take a deeper look at this important issue in the subfield of
international political economy.
2. GAME-THEORETICAL MODEL
As a heuristic device, we analyse the US decision to use Section (Super) 301
to demonstrate the potential pitfalls associated with the omission of selections
biases in statistical studies. This trade policy-making tool constitutes a prime
example of the strategic use of economic sanctions. This important component of
US trade laws represents an assertive position by American lawmakers, coined
aggressive unilateralism by Bhagwati (Bhagwati and Patrick, 1990), which de-
mands that its trading partners reduce their real or imaginary barriers to US
exports and investments. The United States decides what are deemed unfair
practices and asks for trade concessions without offering any concessions. Section
(Super) 301 is often publicised and backed by implicit and, often, explicit threats
1 A study by Reinhardt (2001) on the adjudication of GATT disputes constitutes a clear break-
through in the study of counterfactuals in International Political Economy. His article develops an
incomplete information model of trade disputes under GATT that reveals ‘not only the general
patterns of concessions before and after the rulings but also the variation in the outcomes across
rulings of different types’ (p. 190).
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of retaliation. Hence, Section (Super) 301 does not constitute an episode of
sanctions per se. Target countries are allowed to negotiate an agreement before
America puts forth sanctions vis-à-vis these states. In other words, a country is
targeted for its unfair trade practices, but it has another chance to mend its fences
with its American counterparts before sanctions are implemented. More specifi-
cally, the Trade Act of 1974, under Sections 301–302:2
granted the President authority to take any of a broad range of actions against a country that
maintains unjustifiable or unreasonable tariff or other import restrictions (Destler, 1995, p. 126).
It also authorised action against foreign export subsidies. The Trade Agreement
Act of 1979 expanded the Trade Act of 1974 and gave to the President the
authority to enforce trade agreements. It also allowed for detailed procedures for
investigation (including deadlines for action), and the use of available settlement
procedures (Bayard and Elliott, 1994). Later, the Trade and Tariff Act of 1984
authorised retaliation in the service sector (idem). Finally, ‘the Omnibus Trade
and Competitiveness Act of 1988 created Super 301’ and shifted the authority to
retaliate from the President to the United States Trade Representative (USTR).
However, the process is still dependent on some presidential directives (idem). It
also made retaliation against ‘unjustifiable’ practices mandatory.3
In this section, we suggest a game-theoretical model that accounts for the
strategic nature of the decision-making process of opening a Section (Super) 301
case (see Figure 1).
The interplay between domestic lobbying groups (L), the USTR (G) and
foreign targets (T) can be represented in a simple extensive form game, in which a
lobbying group moves first and decides whether to file a petition with the govern-
ment claiming injury from unfair trading practices by a foreign government. If a
petition is filed, the President and, later, the USTR decide whether to open a case
against the foreign target. If the US opens a case, the foreign target then decides
whether to stand firm in the face of this threat or to back down and change its
policy. Finally, if the foreign government stands firm, the President/USTR de-
cides whether to make good on its threat and enact sanctions or to back down.4
2 It is not our intention here to provide a detailed assessment of the evolution of Section (Super)
301. For more information see Bhagwati and Patrick (1990) and Bayard and Elliot (1994), espe-
cially Chapter 2.
3 This evolution of American trade laws can have an impact on bargaining outcomes. For instance,
in the escalation game that we introduce below, the last branch of the tree becomes irrelevant if
American retaliation becomes mandatory.
4 We could add two additional moves in the game by the target country/firm. In a first move, the
target could have to make a decision on whether or not to initiate a trade policy that can potentially
prod an American firm to file a petition with the USTR. We could also add a move by a target after
a petition was filed. A target could decide to back down (i.e. change its trade policy to American
satisfaction) before a formal case is open. The omission of these two moves inserts additional
selection biases. We have decided to present a simpler game at this juncture of our research.
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FIGURE 1
Extensive Form of Bargaining Game
a. Outcomes/Pay-offs
If the lobbying group does not petition, each player receives its status quo pay-
off sqi. If the lobbying group files and the President/USTR does not open a case
the lobbying group receives its status quo pay-off less the cost of lobbying, −cL,
and the President/USTR and the foreign state receive their status quo pay-off.5 If
the President/USTR opens a case and the foreign target backs down, the firm
receives increased access to the foreign market and pays the cost of filing (aL −
cL), the government receives some benefit from increased access (aG) and the target
government loses the benefit it derived from generating rents for its protected
industry (−rT). If, however, the target state stands firm in the face of the President/
USTR’s threats and the President/USTR back down, the firm receives its status
quo pay-off less the costs of lobbying (−cL), the government pays a cost for
issuing a threat and backing down (−cG) and the foreign state receives its status
quo pay-off (sqT). Finally, if the President/USTR makes good on its threat to
sanction the target state, a trade dispute takes place. We represent the actors’
evaluations of such a dispute as lotteries. There is some probability p that the
dispute will end with the target state granting access to its market, and some
probability (1 − p) that the dispute will end with the US removing sanctions. The
actors’ pay-offs, therefore, can be seen as weighted averages of what they re-
ceived when, on the one hand, the target backed down (aL − cL, aG, −rT) and when
the US backed down (−cL, −cG, sqT). However, it is important to recognise that
there are other consequences from an ongoing trade dispute. First, there is likely
5 One can imagine a ‘domestic politics’ sub-game occurring after the US fails to issue a threat in
which the lobbying group decides whether or not to punish the President/USTR in some way for its
lack of responsiveness, but since our model is not primarily concerned with that particular domestic
politics story, we will not pursue this here.
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to be a disruption to markets that impose an efficiency cost on all actors involved
(−di). Second, this disruption creates an opportunity for rent-seeking by firms in
the US from which policy-makers may also derive benefits (either in the form of
enhanced political support or revenues) ri, I ∈ (L, G). Finally, the imposition of
sanctions reduces the target country’s access to US markets (−aT).6 Thus, the
firm’s pay-off for a trade dispute is:
p(aL − cL) + (1 − p)(−cL) + rL − dL.
This simplifies to:
paL − cL + rL − dL.
The USTR’s pay-off for a trade dispute is:
paG + (1 − p)(−cG) + rG − dG.
The target state’s pay-off for a trade dispute is given by:
p(−rT) + (1 − p)sq − aT − dT.
We will assume that all costs are non-zero (ci > 0, di > 0) and that each actor
places a positive value on access to the other’s market ai > 0 and appropriating
rents ri > 0. Without loss of generality, pay-offs can fruitfully be normalised in
the following manner. Assume that at the start of the game the target state has
privileged access to one of its markets and it assigns a value of one to this
outcome. The firm and the USTR, under such conditions, receive a pay-off of
zero. Should the US gain access, the lobbying group and the USTR each receive
a pay-off of one. Figure 2 displays the extensive form of the game after pay-offs
have been normalised and, where possible, the pay-offs simplified.
b. Behaviour Under Complete Information
The complete information game can be solved using backward induction.
(i) Trade disputes
The government responds to a target that stands firm by adopting retaliatory
measures when:
p + (1 − p)(−cG) + rG − dG ≥ −cG, (1)
6 The magnitude of the consequences of the trade dispute is determined, in part, by the duration
and intensity of the dispute. The duration of the negotiations and magnitude of a trade dispute can
be explained by a Stahl-Rubinstein bargaining model (Duchesne, 1997, Ch. 3).
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FIGURE 2
The Extensive Form of the Steps to a Trade Dispute, with Normalised Pay-offs
which is the case whenever p(1 + cG) + rG − dG ≥ 0. Not surprisingly, the likeli-
hood of a trade dispute occurring is increasing with the government’s confidence
that it will accomplish its goal through such a dispute. Put differently, the state
will only retaliate when it is sufficiently confident that it will win a trade dispute,















This can be interpreted as the condition that must be satisfied for the govern-
ment’s decision to open a case to be considered a credible threat. Note that when
the right-hand side of (2) is greater than one, no amount of confidence in the
outcome of a trade dispute can make retaliatory threats credible. This is most
likely to be the case when trade disputes create large disruptions in markets
compared to the rents they generate for the threatening state and the cost of
policy failure (i.e. when dG − rG − cG > 1). Notice that when the right-hand side of
the equation is greater than one and a case is not open, this case is not included
in previous statistical analyses (Bayard and Elliott, 1994; and Duchesne, 1997).
Consequently, it introduces a selection bias that may inflate the level of bargain-
ing success for American negotiators.
The target state’s behaviour will, of course, hinge on whether the credibility
condition in (2) is met. When (2) is met, the target state chooses, in essence,
between acquiescing and engaging in a trade dispute by standing firm against a
resolute government. It will stand firm if:
1 ≥ pT + aT + dT (3)
but will acquiesce otherwise. One can think of the case where (3) is satisfied as
the case of the ‘resolute target’. Note that the target’s resolve is decreasing as its
probability of ‘losing’ a trade dispute is increasing, the utility it derives from the
access to the US market, and the disruptions expected from a dispute.
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Trade disputes occur only when (2) and (3) are both met; that is, when a
resolute target encounters a credible threat. Put differently, p has to be suffi-
ciently large for the government to be confident that it can win a dispute, but not
so large that the target state will do better by acquiescing.7
(ii) Opening a case
Clearly, the decision by the government to open a case is influenced by its
expectations regarding the target’s response and its chances of prevailing should
a full-scale trade dispute erupt. For example, if (2) and (3) are satisfied, the
government chooses between opening a case that will escalate and averting a
trade dispute by rebuffing the lobbying group. It will choose the former only
when the left-hand side of (1) yields a higher pay-off than the status quo, which
is the case only if:
p + (1 − p)(−cG) + rG − dG ≥ 0. (4)















When (2) is not satisfied, then the target state always responds to the opening of
a case by standing firm and since the government always does better by not
opening a case that it knows it will abandon, it will not initiate a case under such
circumstances. Note, this last result means that policy failure that is not preceded
by retaliatory measures should not occur under complete information. In contrast,
policy success without the resort to retaliatory measures can be observed under
complete information. This is so because if (3) is not satisfied, then the govern-
ment will be willing to open a case whether or not it is willing to make good on
its threat to adopt retaliatory measures, because the target acquiescence means
policy success in either case.
Table 1 summarises the various outcomes that can be observed in equilibrium
in the complete information game. Notice that each of the conditions on equilib-
rium behaviour can be expressed in terms of the probability that the US will
prevail in a trade dispute, should one occur. Such a conflict could, itself, be
modelled as a bargaining situation in which disputants negotiate over how to
divide the potential gains from trade while costly delays result in the erosion of
the overall size of the pie. Following Schelling (1960) and Putnam (1988),
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Duchesne and Clark (1995), and Clark, Duchesne and Meunier (2000) argue that
success in such a bargaining situation is increasing in the number of domestic
veto players a country possesses, relative to the number of veto players in the
country with which it is bargaining. Thus, as the ratio between the number of
veto players in the US to the number of veto players in the target country rises,
the probability of US success in a trade dispute (p) rises. In light of this interpre-
tation of p, therefore, Table 1 suggests that when the ‘institutional advantage’ of
the US over its trading partners is low, the conditions for a credible American
threat are less likely to be met, and consequently no cases will be opened.
President/USTR will tend to not open cases. When the ‘institutional’ advantage
is large enough to satisfy the credibility constraint and large enough to deter
resistance from targets, the USTR/President will open cases and the target coun-
try will adjust its policies to deter a dispute.8 In a middle range, however, the
probability of US success in a dispute may be sufficiently high so as to be
credible, but sufficiently low that the target state prefers entering a dispute to
backing down.9
These conditions are very different from Duchesne’s (1997) theoretical and
empirical model. If we interpreted his model correctly, he assumed that a larger p
– that is, when the structure of negotiation favours the Americans – leads to an
TABLE 1
Equilibrium Outcomes Under Various Conditions














Inequality 1 − aT − dT ≥ p Not Policy Success No Case
(Condition (3) ) Satisfied
‘Resolute Target’
Trade Dispute


























 then no case occurs (condition (5) ).
8 In fact, one can imagine a model in which the target country’s policy is endogenous and
accommodative policies are adopted in order to deter filings from the US.
9 Note that the potential for rent-seeking behaviour created by trade disputes leaves open the
possibility that both states will enter a dispute even when there is complete information. In contrast,
many crisis bargaining models treat war as an outcome that players associate with negative
expected utility. As a result, wars in these models only occur when information is limited.
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outcome where the Americans are more likely to reach their objectives. Condi-
tions (2), (3) and (5) demonstrate that it may not be the case. These conditions
assume a non-monotonic relationship between the probability of success and the
decision to open a Section 301 case. There are a few reasons for his model
misspecification. First, by omitting to test for non-random selection of cases, his
empirical analysis only includes cases where condition (2) is met. As our analysis
demonstrates, the cases that fall in the left-side column of Table 1 have an impact
on the outcome of a trade negotiation. Second, even if condition (2) is met, there
is no guarantee that it will increase the likelihood of American bargaining suc-
cess, which Duchesne’s non-strategic empirical model assumes. They may reach
their objectives when they face an irresolute target (condition (3) is not met). If
this is the case, there is no discrepancy between the ordered multinomial logit
analysis and the strategic choice model. If they face a resolute target (condition
(3) is met), the outcome is indeterminate. It is possible that a case will not be
opened if condition (5) is not met or the case will escalate to trade war. If the
case escalates to a trade war, Americans face the probability (1 − p) that they will
not meet their objectives (policy failure). If indeed it leads to a policy failure,
then there is an important discrepancy between the two models. Third, notice the
difference between the expectations of the ordered multinomial logit analysis
and our strategic game-theoretical model in regards to the probability of policy
failure. The multinomial logit analysis expectation is that as the structure of
negotiation shifts in favour of a foreign target, the probability of American policy
failure increases. In the strategic model, policy failure occurs only under strict
conditions. It can only happen when conditions (2), (3) and (5) are met, that is
when both sides are willing to take the risk of ending up in a trade war. It can
only happen in the middle range cases where both sides believe that their advan-
tageous structure of negotiation is well worth the risk of a trade dispute. Unfortu-
nately, many of the cases that we observe fall in this lower left cell of Table 1.
Therefore, assuming a linear relationship between variables, when the true rela-
tionship is non-monotonic, leads to an estimation that is biased and inconsistent.
(iii) Petitioning for the opening of a case
Since lobbying is costly, it will only take place when there is some expectation
that the government will be responsive. Thus, private sector groups will lobby the
government only if there is some chance that the government will open a case
that has a significant chance of being successful. Thus, if the credibility condition
(2) is not satisfied, the lobbying group faces a choice between not lobbying for
policy changes or lobbying for policy changes and getting no response. Because
lobbying is costly and instrumental, we do not observe a demand for policy
change. If the credibility condition is satisfied, and the institutional advantage
of the US is sufficiently large to deter resistance from the target (i.e. (3) is not
satisfied) then the lobbying group will lobby as long as the cost of doing so is not
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greater than the benefits of opening up foreign markets.10 If the probability of US
success is sufficiently high to make retaliatory threats attractive and credible, but
not so high as to lead to target acquiescence, then interest groups will lobby for
them if p − cL + rL − dL > 0.
The decision by a lobbying group to maintain the status quo introduces a
selection effect at the beginning of the game. It can be in the anticipation that the
issue would not be resolved to the American satisfaction that the firm decides to
maintain the status quo. Under this scenario, the firm might prefer to maintain the
status quo, even if it means that it will still face an ‘unfair’ trade practice by a
foreign target, and avoid paying the cost of lobbying. This indicates that there is
connection between the decision to initiate a case and the outcome of a trade
negotiation. If a case is not initiated, we do not know what the decisions by other
actors would have been at subsequent nodes. There is a strong possibility that if
such cases had been initiated, it would decrease the rate of success obtained by
American negotiators. Ergo, the factors (e.g. resolve and willingness) that affect
the decision to initiate a case can also be factors that affect the outcome of an
eventual negotiation. Empirically, it signifies that unobserved factors such as
resolve and willingness are relegated to the error terms in both equations. Conse-
quently, the error terms in both equations are correlated and an ordered multinomial
logit analysis does not mirror the theoretical and empirical relationship between
case initiation and negotiation outcome.
3. SIMULATIONS
Our formalisation suggests that the choice to open a Section 301 case is strategic.
The decision to open the case is explicitly based on future expectations about the
likelihood of a trade dispute. As a result, observations of the use of Section 301
are not a random sample of cases. Rather, the use of Section 301 represents a
self-selected set of cases based on the characteristics of the cases themselves.
Therefore, empirical analyses of Section 301 failing to account for factors influenc-
ing the government’s strategic choice to open a case may lead to fallacious
conclusions. Specifically, our formalisation suggests some of the same factors
influencing the decision to open a Section 301 case are also related to the sub-
sequent evolution of the case. This is a classic example of selection bias induced
by strategic interaction. We use Monte Carlo simulations to illustrate how the
strategic choice to open a Section 301 case may cause selection bias. Monte
Carlo simulations are a useful tool for studying the effect of econometric model-
ling choices and characteristics of historical data on our ability to consistently
10 Obviously, since there is only one lobbying group in our model, this abstracts from the free-rider
problem.
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estimate the population parameters of interest in a controlled environment. We
use the simulations to gather information about the sampling distribution of our
estimate of institutional constraints. This allows us to compare the sampling
distribution under different conditions to the population parameter for institu-
tional constraints.
It is important to consider how non-random selection may affect studies of
Section 301, because our model shows that the likelihood of the government
opening a case is a function of the government’s bargaining power. In turn, the
government’s bargaining power is also related to the decision to retaliate against
a target with a trade dispute. Put simply, the bargaining power of the government
has both a direct and indirect effect on the probability of a trade dispute. The
direct effect appears in the government’s decision to retaliate against the target
state, and the indirect effect comes through the government’s decision to open
the case in the first place. Empirical studies only analysing the government’s
decision to initiate a trade dispute miss the indirect effect of the government’s
bargaining power through the government’s choice to open the case in the first
place.
We begin by assuming the government’s bargaining power is increasing with
its institutional constraints. Therefore, we expect high institutional constraints to
be related to the decision to open a Section 301 case. We randomly generate
1,000 observations of a constraint variable normally distributed with a mean of
zero and a variance of one. Next, we create a variable indexing the state’s deci-
sion to open a Section 301 case:
Open = α0 + α1Constraints + ε, (6)
where Open represents the latent utility for opening a Section 301 case and
Constraints enhance the utility for opening such a case. Moreover, ε is a random
error term normally distributed with a mean of zero and a variance of one. Next,
we generate a variable indexing the decision to initiate a trade dispute:
Trade Dispute = β0 + β1Constraints + u, (7)
where Trade Dispute is the latent utility for initiating a trade dispute as a function
of institutional constraints and random error term u distributed normally with a
mean of zero and variance equal to one. In addition, the correlation between ε
and u is indexed by ρ.
We normalise the intercepts in the models to zero and we set α1 = 6 and β1 = 4.
These are the true population parameters. The purpose of the simulation is to
determine how the strategic choice to open a case may limit our ability to recover
a consistent estimate of the population parameters. That is, how does the mean
of the sampling distribution for our estimate of β1 compare to the population
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parameter. To illustrate the self-selection anticipated by our formal model, we
only analyse the case where Open > 0. All other cases are dropped. This captures
the self-selection into trade disputes as a function of institutional constraints.
Essentially, we assume cases are only opened when the latent utility for opening
the dispute is greater than zero. If the latent utility for opening the case is less
than zero, no case is opened, making it impossible to observe a trade dispute.
Cases are only opened when the government expects to benefit. We repeat this
simulation 1,000 times for values of ρ from −0.9 to 0.9. Each set of 1,000
simulations makes up the sampling distribution for our estimate of β1 at various
levels of ρ.
Table 2 summarises the difference between the true effect of institutional
constraints on the likelihood of a trade dispute and the relationship in the self-
selected sample as a function of the correlation between the disturbance terms in
both models. The first column indexes the correlation between the error terms in
the model of opening a Section 301 case and the decision to initiate a trade
dispute. The last two columns show the mean and standard deviation of the
sampling distribution for the estimated parameter. Only when there is no correla-
tion between the error terms do we recover the correct effect of institutional
constraints on the likelihood of a trade dispute. Moreover, the inconsistency
increases with ρ and can go either way depending on the sign on ρ. As ρ goes to
its negative extreme, the estimated effect of institutional constraints is inflated.
Likewise, the estimated effect of institutional constraints is underestimated as ρ
TABLE 2
Results of Monte Carlo Simulation
ρ Estimate Simulations Mean Standard Deviation
−0.9 β 1,000 4.245962 0.069365
−0.9 se 1,000 0.071237 0.003895
−0.7 β 1,000 4.191348 0.07358
−0.7 se 1,000 0.071803 0.003731
−0.5 β 1,000 4.137475 0.070382
−0.5 se 1,000 0.072397 0.003733
−0.3 β 1,000 4.078965 0.073301
−0.3 se 1,000 0.072551 0.003698
0 β 1,000 3.998182 0.073513
0 se 1,000 0.072845 0.00378
0.3 β 1,000 3.916713 0.07296
0.3 se 1,000 0.072644 0.003721
0.5 β 1,000 3.859921 0.074796
0.5 se 1,000 0.07224 0.003706
0.7 β 1,000 3.80811 0.073176
0.7 se 1,000 0.071858 0.00372
0.9 β 1,000 3.753627 0.072165
0.9 se 1,000 0.071466 0.003654
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goes to its positive extreme. Depending on the correlation between the error
terms, the inconsistency can be substantial. The results suggest it is important to
consider the decision to initiate a trade dispute and the decision to open a Section
301 case jointly, and studies failing to correct for the effect of the strategic choice
to open a Section 301 case may yield misleading results about the decision to
initiate a trade dispute. An important next step for this research is to construct an
econometric model equipped to jointly model the decision to open a Section 301
case and the decision to initiate a trade dispute.
4. CONCLUSION
This article has identified some potential estimation problems in the subfield of
international political economy. Our game-theoretical model and Monte Carlo
simulation demonstrated that, despite significant results, some statistical studies
of trade policy-making might potentially suffer from misspecification due to
non-random selection effects. These problems are not inherent to the assessment
of the level of success by American negotiators when they choose to formally
open a Section 301 case. For instance, our model could also shed light on the
decision to open anti-dumping and countervailing cases, as well as the decision
to use economic sanctions against a rogue state. In addition, it is not the exclusive
prerogative of the United States to use such policy instruments and accordingly
further studies should move into the comparative realm by assessing the impact
of strategic interaction on trade policy decisions of a vast number of states.
In this article we chose to focus on Section 301 because it constitutes a policy
tool that has been intensely studied from different angles by jurists, political
scientists and economists. Despite such an enormous literature on the effective-
ness of this policy tool, we can raise some doubts on the many of the conclusions
reached in these studies. The decision to use Section 301 as a heuristic device
was a conscious decision by the authors. If we can be potentially wrong about
something we think we know a lot about, it is also likely that we reach erroneous
conclusions about things we know little about.
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